Wednesday, October 27, 2010

Essay three edits

I took into account what I found and the comments, and here's what I have:


Escaping Malthus: The Contraceptive of Prosperity
            The English economist Thomas Malthus is well known for creating the branch of population thought known as Malthusian theory. His theory about the behavior of the human population is, “It may safely be pronounced, therefore, that population, when unchecked, goes on doubling itself every twenty-five years, or increases in a geometrical ratio” (Malthus). That is the definition of Malthusian theory. He was right in his time, the late 18th century, but has become wrong. As stated in Malthus’s An Essay on the Principle of Population, human population does tend to increase rapidly, but that rate of increase has slowed to a near halt in economically developed countries (Eberstadt). Something has clearly changed about the human condition since Malthus wrote his commentary. The 18th century to 2010 is a rather large time span, but two particular factors which contribute to the fertility drop in developed countries can be isolated. This drop in fertility is called the demographic-economic paradox (Klingholz) Broadly, they are the economic and social components, more specifically, economic structure as opportunity cost, along with religion as social norms.
            The economic structure of what are now called the ‘developed’ countries is highly specialized, with people working in one skill area (Glossary). Those developed countries also have a much higher percentage of inhabitants in urban areas than in developing areas (Urbanization). Those factors, together, tend to contribute to a high cost of living for developed countries. Because of that high cost of living, any action tends to have more of what is called “opportunity cost”. Opportunity cost is, in economics, the loss incurred by a person by taking a specific action over another, or doing nothing (Opportunity). Before the urbanization of the developed countries, there was great incentive to have many children, as each child was a net economic gain at a very young age. This is because they might work on a family farm or contribute to a family-run business (Kröhnert, Klingholz). Now, the opportunity cost of children continues to rise.
            That cost reached new heights recently; a child born in 2009 will cost a middle-class family roughly one-quarter million dollars to raise to the age of 18 (Lino). Even as the cost of raising a child increases, the opportunity cost for the mother also increases. Currently, women have a much greater chance of earning more money than men, meaning they are giving up much more should they choose to take leave to have or raise a child (Fry, Cohn). Those factors are very important to a person when deciding to change their life as much as a having a child will. On a standard psychological scale of 0-100, with 100 being the death of a spouse, pregnancy was rated a 40 in terms of stressful life events, with stress used here to mean ‘change in routine’ (Fontana). With that type of change in routine, it is very likely that a person would consider the long term consequences. This analysis, however, takes into account only impersonal economic factors, not ideals. Religion, or lack thereof, is also strongly correlated to the demographic-economic paradox
            The Washington Post columnist Nicholas Eberstadt offers a well phrased indictment of only examining the economic factors:
The main explanation for the U.S.-European fertility gap may lie not in material factors but in the seemingly ephemeral realm of values, ideals, attitudes and outlook. In striking contrast to Western Europe, which is provocatively (but not unfairly) described as a "post-Christian" territory these days, religion is alive and well in the United States (Eberstadt).
His statement is very clear, and supported elsewhere. Three psychologists conducted a study which found that the decisively religious are far overrepresented among those with the largest families. After controlling for confounding variables, they found that religiosity continued to be the sole strong correlation (Blume et. al). Their argument concludes with a pithy explanation, “…it is a matter of the readiness to pass up on options. Making no decision often amounts to a decision against having children. Becoming a bit pregnant is literally an impossibility (Blume et. al).” In essence, as people become less religious, their attitudes toward children become more ambivalent, as opposed to the strident pro-natal attitudes fostered by almost all religions.
            From that information, it is safe to say that the demographic-economic paradox is fostered by a combination of economic and associated social factors. As the economy becomes more active and vibrant, cities tend to develop, bringing the higher opportunity cost of children and the lower immediate benefit of the same. The secularization of society which tends to accompany economic progress also contributes to the drop in fertility. In short, rising economic prosperity creates conditions which make having children costly and cause ambivalent social attitudes toward having children (Blume et. al). This combination of causes leads to the obvious effect of escaping Malthus’s dire predictions for humanity- his indictment of the human state, “…the constant tendency in the human race to increase beyond the means of subsistence (Malthus).” The escape is very striking in scope; there may be additional effects, namely the demographic transition of the world population. This transition is that from a young populace to an older one; it is caused mainly by the decline in fertility currently occurring in the developed world (Gavrilov, Heuveline). Shifting demographics have the potential to remake the world, so their causes deserve far more analysis than has been given. Greater attention to this topic is needed in order to understand the demographic-economic paradox and its possible effects on the world.

No comments:

Post a Comment